Deposit insurance as an asymmetric information regulation method. The question of moral hazard
Keywords:
information asymmetry, deposit insurance system, moral hazard, lender of last resort.Abstract
The regulation of asymmetric information by using of the deposit insurance has been examined. The conclusions have been drawn as for the ways of related problems` resolution.
References
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